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I. Introduction
This article surveys developments in international tax during 2012, with a particular
focus this year on global reactions to the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA).1 Four years have passed since the global economic meltdown of 2008. No-
where are the depressed economies of the world and the trillions in deficits more apparent
than in the tax arena. In response to increased attention by public media, tax administra-
tions have increased their efforts to collaborate so as to ensure that high net-worth indi-
viduals and multi-nationals - the perceived beneficiaries of tax breaks on the national and
international stage - pay their "fair" share of taxes.
H. International Initiatives on Transparency and Information Exchange
Efforts to counter tax planning by well-advised, wealthy individuals and high profile
multi-nationals are not new. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) and the Business
and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) have long led these efforts. Other organizations such as
the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF), and the U.N. Committee on Money Laundering have also
participated in these efforts. Early examples of the OECD work in this area include the
Double Tax Conventions and Conduit Companies Report, going back to 1986, and the
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1. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501-41, 124 Stat. 71, 97-117
(2010).
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1998 Harmful Tax Competition Report. More recent initiatives include the creation of
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes
(Global Forum), the Report on Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes,
the Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE) Project, the Joint Audit Proto-
col (which seeks to include joint examination in a single coordinated audit), and the recent
revision of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters.
Inadequate information exchange was one of the greatest issues facing tax administra-
tions worldwide at the beginning of this process. Under bilateral Double Tax Agreements
(DTA), jurisdictions did not have adequate information exchange in place. Historically,
many tax haven and preferential tax regime jurisdictions did not participate in this bilateral
process at all. Even where jurisdictions had entered into bilateral DTAs, there were often
issues as to sufficiency of trained resources and effective procedures to collect and ex-
change relevant information. The Global Forum2 has worked to put in place key princi-
ples on tax transparency and information exchange for tax purposes. It has also put in
place "mechanisms for exchange of information upon request" and for expanded exchange
of information in both criminal and civil matters.3 This information is not restricted
based on dual criminality principles or domestic tax interests. At the same time, the
Global Forum has established confidentiality standards for information exchanged that act
as safeguards for taxpayers and tax administrators. Further, it has created principles for
availability of reliable information, particularly bank, ownership, identity, and accounting
information.4 It has helped to provide support for tax administrations, especially in
emerging economies, to collect information and build their systems locally. These econo-
mies can then honor their commitments under bilateral agreements more effectively.
Newer initiatives within the OECD and the Global Forum focus on automatic exchange
of information to facilitate even greater accessibility to relevant information among coop-
erating tax administrations.5 The Global Forum includes 116 member jurisdictions, the
European Union, and 12 international observers. 6 Since its peer review project began in
2009, 110 peer reviews have been launched, 88 peer reviews have been completed and
published, and over 800 Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) have been
signed.7
This level of cooperation among governments is unprecedented. It results directly from
the financial crisis that peaked in April 2009, the same time as the G20 meeting in
London. There, the G20 countries committed to support, and have since continued to
support, the OECD's efforts to encourage increased transparency in and disclosure of tax
2. Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Global Forum on Transparency and Erchange of
Information for Tax Purposes: About the Global Forum, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/abourtheglobal
forum.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) ("The Global Forum has been the multilateral framework within which
work in the area transparency and exchange of information has been carried out by both OECD and non-
OECD economies since 2000.").
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANsPARENscY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES:
INFoRMATION BRIEF 10 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/Journalist's%20
brief%20December%202012.pdf.
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 3.
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information.8 In November 2011,. at its Cannes summit, the G20 added its unanimous
support to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Mat-
ters.9 Over fifty countries have either signed the Convention or indicated their intent to
do so.10 The G20's decision to back OECD initiatives aimed at counteracting aggressive
tax planning is driven by the need to reduce its members' budgetary deficits.'I The result-
ing initiatives include building transparent tax compliance by banks, engaging high net-
worth individuals on tax compliance, improving relationships between tax administrators
and multinationals, and using the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre
(JITSIC) as a forum for tax administrations to shorten learning curves and exchange ex-
periences on cross-border tax shelter and other tax minimization arrangements.
III. The United States and FATCA
Historically, the U.S. position on these initiatives was somewhat unclear. Many juris-
dictions still consider the United States to be a destination of choice for foreign investors
in off-shoring assets. Historically, foreign persons have not been subject to U.S. tax ex-
cept on U.S. source income. Reporting to U.S. withholding agents has been minimal.
Since 2008, however, this has changed substantially.
U.S. pressure has severely affected the Swiss banking industry. This began with the
disclosure of approximately 4450 UBS U.S. account holders and several probes and indict-
ments. 12 In February 2012, the United States indicted Wegelin, a private Swiss Bank, for
conspiring to conceal over $1.2 billion in U.S. taxpayer funds.' 3 The Wegellin indictment
is a prominent example of the many U.S. prosecutions undertaken or in progress against
U.S. taxpayers, individual bankers, and financial institutions over the past years for con-
cealing foreign-based assets of U.S. persons.
8. GROUP OF TwENEY [G20], LONDON SuMar LEADERS' STATEMENT (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/documents/?query=London+Summit&chm&=documenttype=&extended-mode=0.
9. Press Release, OECD, Tax: G20 Countries Strengthen International Tax Co-operation, (Nov. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctplexchangeofinformation/taxg20countriesstrengtheninternationaltaxco-
operation.htm.
10. As of December 5, 2012, the OECD has reported that ninety jurisdictions have substantially imple-
mented the internationally agreed standard "endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers at their Berlin Meeting
in 2004 and by the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters at its October
2008 Meeting." OECD, PROGREss REPORT ON THE JURISDICTIONS SURVEYED BY THE OECD GLOBAL
FORUM IN IMPLEMENTING THE INTERNATIONALLY AGREED TAx STANDARD (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http/www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/progress%20report%205%20december%202012.pdf. This standard
"requires exchange of information on request in all tax matters for the administration and enforcement of
domestic tax law without regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax purposes." Id.
11. OECD, TACKLING AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING THROUGH IMPROVED TRANsPARENCY AND Dis-
CLOSURE: REPORT ON DISCLOSURE INrrATIvES 6 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/ex-
changeofinformation/48322860.pdf.
12. United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2524345, at *S (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009)
(settlement agreement between The United States and UBS AG).
13. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Swiss Bank Indicted on U.S. Tax Charges (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12 -tax- 153.html.
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From a revenue standpoint, the 200914 and 201115 U.S. Voluntary Disclosure Programs
yielded over $4.4 billion in revenue collections.16 The UBS settlement added $750 mil-
lion to that amount.17 Various European jurisdictions have offered voluntary disclosure
programs with similar results. The 2010 German voluntary disclosure program resulted
in over C4 billion of tax revenue.18 The U.K.'s program for Liechtenstein investments is
expected to contribute over 23 billion.19 Spain expects C2.5 billion from its program.20
The common denominator of these programs is the leverage granted to tax authorities
from their collective cooperation and willingness to exchange information. This includes
information obtained on questionable legal grounds.
On March 18, 2010, the U.S. enacted legislation adding a new chapter four, the Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) (sections 1471-1474) to subtitle A of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE)
Act.21 This legislation is unilateral and highly controversial. It is directed, primarily, at a
broadly defined group of "foreign financial institutions" (FFI).22 Its basic thrust is to im-
pose a U.S. withholding tax of 30 percent on all "withholdable payments" 23 made to all
non-participating FFIs. A defined category of existing obligations have been
grandfathered. Withholding is scheduled to begin January 1, 2014 and to be fully effec-
tive by January 1, 2017.24 To become participating, FFIs and all of their affiliates must
agree with the I.R.S. to fulfill certain registration,25 due diligence, reporting, and tax col-
14. I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-84 (Sept. 21, 2009).
15. I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-84 (Aug. 8, 2011).
16. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012).
17. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html.
18. OECD, OFFSHORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIs, GUIDANCE AND PoucY AD-
VICE 9 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxadministration/45967994.pdf.
19. Carolyn Bandel, Liechtenstein May Roll Out More Tax Amnesties, Government Says, BLOOMBERG (July 13,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-13Aiechtenstein-may-roll-out-more-tax-amnesties-gov-
ernment-says.html.
20. Andres Gonzales & Paul Day, Spain Tax Amnesty Deal Far from Government Target, REUTERS UK EDI-
TION (Dec. 3, 2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/12/03/uk-spain-tax-idUKBRE8B20S920121203.
21. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501-41, 124 Stat. 71, 71, 97-
117 (2010); see also IRS, SUMARY OF KEY FATCA PROVISIONS (an. 24, 2013), available at http://www.irs.
gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-Key-FATCA-Provisions (discussing details of FATCA legislation).
22. I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/
irbl0-37.pdf.
23. A "withholdable payment" is "any payment of interest, . . . dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums,
annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical
gains, profits, and income ... from sources within the United States." The term also includes "any gross
proceeds from the sale ... of any property ... [that could] produce interest or dividends from sources within
the United States." FATCA §§ 501-41, 124 Stat. at 97, 103.
24. Patrick B. Fenn et al., Tax Alert: New Guidance Sets Forth Delayed Timelines for Due Diligence and Other
Requirements UnderFATCA, AKIN Gump STRAUSS HAUER & FELD, LLP (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.ak-
ingump.com/files/Publication/f6b5402c-feda-41fb-bfD9-3425810ec7e7/Presentation/PublicationAttach-
ment/75cee7dO-bO3a-400c-89bc-b39515350996/121031_- Tax_- Alert.pdf.
25. "In building an online system for ... [FFIs] to register as participating FFIs, the IRS has [attempted to
develop] a flexible system ... [that allows the FFI) to create accounts, [choose] login and passwords, create
challenge questions and maintain the account once formed." IRS, DETAILS ON THE FATCA REGISTRATION





lection and remittance requirements. Participating FFIs must work directly with the U.S.
government, as provided in Proposed Regulations to the IRC issued in February 2012.26
The obligations often conflict with local laws on privacy, disclosure, anti-discrimina-
tion, collection, and remittance of foreign taxes to which the foreign financial institutions
are subject in their own jurisdictions of organization or operation. In complying with the
U.S. requirements, they would potentially encounter legal or regulatory sanctions, civil
claims, and possibly criminal actions.
To address this issue, the U.S. government has collaborated with its G5 trading partners
- Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, France and Italy - to create a bilateral inter-
governmental agreement to implement FATCA compliance and reporting.
The joint initiative with the G5 countries was announced contemporaneously with the
release of the regulations in February of 2012. On July 6, 2012, the United States released
two versions of an intergovernmental model agreement (IGA - Model 1).27 One version
was reciprocal; the other was non-reciprocal. On September 12, 2012, the United States
and the United Kingdom signed the first reciprocal IGA following the Model 1 tem-
plate.28 The inevitable occurred on October 24, 2012 when Announcement 2012-42 was
released. 29 It postpones implementation dates for due diligence procedures to identify and
document accounts to January 1, 2014. It sets January 1, 2014 as the divider for purposes
of categorizing pre-existing and new accounts and the procedures to apply for each. It
postpones withholding on gross proceeds until January 1, 2017 and expands the scope of
grandfathered obligations.
On November 8, 2012, the United States announced that it was at various stages of
exploration, discussion, and negotiation with at least fifty named countries with the intent
to sign similar agreements. 30 A number of Latin American, Asian, Middle Eastern, and
African countries were notably absent from this list. On November 14, 2012, the United
States released a further template of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA - Model 2).31
Model 2 reflects the terms of agreements made with Japan and Switzerland announced by
the U.S. Treasury Department earlier in the year.32 In November and December 2012,
the United States signed five more agreements with Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Spain,
and the United Kingdom.33 The Spanish, Swiss, and Irish agreements have been an-
nounced but are not publicly available. The agreements with Denmark and Mexico use
26. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-15 (Feb. 8, 2012), available athttp://www.irs.gov/uac/Treasury,-IRS-Is-
sue-Proposed-Regulations-for-FATCA-Implementation.
27. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FATCA MODEL INTERGOVERNAENAL AGREEMENT (MODEL 2) (Sept.
12, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCAaspx.
28. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Improve International Tax Compliance and to
Implement FATCA, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 12, 2012 [hereinafter U.K. IGA], available at http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-12-2012.pdf.
29. I.R.S. Announcement 2012-42, I.R.B. 2012-47 (Nov. 19, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/
2012-47 IRB/arO9.html.
30. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, U.S. Engaging with More than 50 Jurisdictions to Curtail Off-
shore Tax Evasion (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl759.aspx.
31. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, supra note 27.
32. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA): Resource Center, http://www.trea-
sury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCAaspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2013).
3 3. Id.
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the IGA - Model 1 format. This will likely also be the case with Spain and Ireland, while
the agreement with Switzerland will be the first of the IGA - Model 2 versions signed.
The significant difference between the two Models is that in the IGA - Model 1 format,
the information flows from reporting financial institutions through the local tax adminis-
tration and then, pursuant to applicable exchange of information provisions under a DTA,
is exchanged between the negotiating FATCA partner jurisdictions. Under the IGA -
Model 2 arrangements, the relationship is established directly between the reporting FFIs
in the FATCA partner jurisdiction and the I.R.S. The FATCA partner jurisdiction enacts
facilitating legislation to accommodate the compliance and reporting requirements.
The major advantages to the FATCA partner jurisdictions of entering into an IGA
include:
* Additional clarification as to the institutions included within the scope of a reporting
financial institution; the specific compliance obligations for reporting financial insti-
tutions; the specific reportable accounts; the exact type of information to be sup-
plied; and the timelines for supplying it. There is still uncertainty as to how the
definitions that determine the entities included as financial institutions will be
construed.
* Included financial institutions will not be required to have a "responsible officer"
certify the completion of FATCA compliance procedures to the I.R.S. Whether the
local tax administrations will require this certification is unclear.
* Under the IGA - Model 1, included financial institutions will not be required to
enter into FFI agreements directly with the I.R.S.
* Included financial institutions, provided that they fulfill all reporting and other obli-
gations to their local tax administration under local domestic legislation on a timely
basis, will be considered compliant and participating FFIs and will not be subject to
FATCA withholding on payments they receive.
* Pass-through withholding obligations are still unclear. Generally, the IGAs relieve
specified holders from certain withholding requirements on pass-through payments,
subject to certain exceptions. Reporting requirements remain an issue, however.
* Included financial institutions will not be required to withhold on recalcitrant
holder accounts or to close such accounts. Reporting on such accounts will still be
required, and it is unclear what happens if the information is not available.
* The "all or nothing" rule relating to affiliated groups has been relaxed. Related
entities or branches prevented from fulfilling requirements by local laws will not
taint the compliant status of a financial institution in a FATCA partner jurisdiction,
subject to certain clearly defined conditions that must be satisfied.
* Specific financial institutions, plans, and products agreed between the FATCA part-
ner jurisdictions will be treated as compliant for or exempted from FATCA.
* A most favored nation clause will ensure that more favorable terms granted in later
IGAs will apply. This provides a needed basis to standardize compliance procedures
and interpretations and will hopefully add a feature of multilateralism to the IGAs
concluded.
These IGAs are comprehensive and clearly advantageous for FFIs and non-resident
foreign entities formed or operating in the FATCA partner jurisdiction. They also afford
benefits of additional clarity to the FATCA partner jurisdiction. Nevertheless, they leave
numerous issues on the table, not the least of which is whether the United States will be
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able to enact proposed legislation domestically that will support its undertakings to supply
reciprocal information to its FATCA partner jurisdictions, by the dates and where pro-
vided for, under the IGAs.
IV. Mexican Perspective
Mexico has taken exchange of information seriously. It has entered into TIEAs with
fourteen countries. 34 TIEAs are being negotiated or are pending entry into force with an
additional nine countries. 35 Mexico also considers thirty-nine of its DTAs to qualify as
TIEAs because they include comprehensive exchange of information provisions following
the OECD Model Convention format.36 Mexico does not consider all its DTAs to be
TIEAs. For example, as of 2012, its DTAs with Belgium and Israel do not qualify as
TIEAs.37 In addition, Mexico is signatory to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Ad-
ministrative Assistance in Tax Matters,3 8 which will enter into force for Mexico in 2013.
Highlights of this Convention include:
* Exchange of information (per request, spontaneous or automatic);
* Simultaneous tax examinations;
* Tax examination can take place abroad;
* Assistance in recovery of foreign taxes and in document service on behalf of a for-
eign jurisdiction in Mexico; and
* Application to taxes on income, value added, capital gain, patrimony, estates, social
security, and other local taxes, except customs duties.39
Mexican residents are estimated to hold assets in excess of U.S. $120 billion in savings
in banks outside of Mexico, most of which are thought to be located in the United States.
In February 2009, Mexico's Treasury Secretary Agustin Carstens sent a letter to U.S.
34. The countries are: the Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Gibral-
tar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Netherland Antilles (Curacao), Saint Maarten, Samoa, and the United
States. OECD, EXCHANGE OF TAx INFORMATION PORTAL: LiST OF MEXICAN EXCHANGE OF INFORMA-
TION AGREEMENTS, http://www.eoi-tax.org/jurisdictions/MX#agreements.
35. These countries include Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Mon-
aco, Santa Lucia, Turks and Caicos and Vanuatu. Id.
36. See DTAs, which are also known as Double Tax Conventions (DTC), with Australia, Austria, Bahrain,
Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany,
The United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and Uruguay. See OECD, supra note 34.
37. See id.
38. Exchange of Information: A Boost to Multilateral Tax Cooperation: 15 Countries Sign Updated Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (May
27, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchangeofinformation/aboosttomultilateraltaxcooperationl5countries
signupdatedconventiononmutualadninistrativeassistanceintaxmatters.htm.
39. The countries currently signatories to the Protocol or the Amended Convention include: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malta,
Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. Guatemala:
Commits to International Exchange of Tax Information, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV.
(Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/directorates/guatemalacommitstointernationalexchangeoftaxinforma-
tion.htm.
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Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, requesting automatic exchange of information on
interest paid by financial institutions resident in Mexico and the United States to residents
of each other's country.40 This exchange of information between Mexico and the United
States already exists for dividends and capital gains.
When FATCA was enacted, Mexico's financial institutions (banks, broker dealers, and
insurance companies) asked the Mexican Treasury Secretary to exempt them from the
requirement that Mexico's financial institutions enter into agreements directly with the
I.R.S. The terms and procedures under IGA - Model 1 provided the perfect vehicle for
Mexico to respond to these requests and to secure its much sought after automatic ex-
change of information. On November 19, 2012, the United States and Mexico entered
into a bilateral reciprocal IGA - Model I to improve international tax compliance, includ-
ing FATCA compliance.41
From a Mexican perspective, one of the major advantages of the IGA is that Mexican
financial institutions need not enter into direct agreements with the I.R.S. The IGA also
facilitates the Mexican Tax Administration Service's ability to secure the following infor-
mation from U.S. Financial Institutions through the I.R.S.:
* Name, address, and Mexican TIN of any person that is a resident of Mexico and is
an account holder of a reportable account;
* Account number or the functional equivalent;
* Name and identifying number of the Reporting U.S. Financial Institution;
* Gross amount of interest paid on a depository account;
* Gross amount of U.S. source dividends paid or credited to the account; and
* Gross amount of other U.S. source income paid or credited to the account, to the
extent subject to reporting under chapters three or sixty-one of subtitle A of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code.
The information on U.S. source income earned by Mexican account holders in 2013
must be delivered by September 2015. Thereafter, information must be exchanged within
nine months of the end of each immediate prior year.
Going forward, Mexico intends to continue as an active participant in the exchange of
information arena. The Secretary General of the OECD is Mexican. As Minister of the
Treasury for Mexico in the mid-1990s, Angel Gurria was instrumental in the enactment of
Mexico's controlled foreign company legislation.
V. United Kingdom and European Perspectives on FATCA
The European perspective on FATCA is clouded because FATCA compliance is very
much a "known unknown." European financial institutions are currently unsure whether
they actually are an FFI for FATCA purposes. Even those who do know they are likely to
be an FFI certainly do not know whether they are likely to be FATCA-compliant in 2014
when withholding taxes become a live issue.
40. Letter from Agustin Carstens, Mex. Sec'y of Fin, to Timothy Geithner, U.S. Sec'y of Treasury (Feb. 9,
2009), http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/Country/mexico-carstens letter.pdf.
41. Agreement Between the Department of the Treasury of the United States of America and the Ministry
of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to Improve International Tax Compliance Includ-




Demonstrating foresight, the national governments of France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom announced their intent to enter into IGAs with the United
States with the aim of clarifying some of the unknowns on a domestic level. They then
negotiated two forms of model templates (IGA - Model 1). On September 12, 2012, the
United Kingdom became the first country to sign an IGA - Model 1 (reciprocal) on the
implementation of FATCA (the U.K. IGA). The United Kingdom has influenced the
development of the IGA - Model 1 in its status as first-mover.
The U.K. IGA broadly follows the IGA - Model 1 although there is a "most favored
nation" (MFN) clause included.42 The MFN clause is welcome because, it is believed, it
will promote consistency of FATCA compliance and implementation, and any concessions
negotiated elsewhere will benefit U.K. Financial Institutions (U.K. FIs). Annex II is a
country specific part of the U.K. IGA, identifying the status of certain U.K. entities and
products.43 It lists U.K. exempt beneficial owners, non-reporting financial institutions,
and exempt products. While these are particular to the United Kingdom, they indicate
the types of products and entities that might be considered in other country specific IGAs.
The U.K. IGA enables U.K FIs to comply with FATCA by reporting directly to the
U.K. tax authority (HMRC), rather than to the U.S. I.R.S.44 Enabling legislation to be
introduced through the Finance Act of 2013 will guarantee this. HMRC will, in turn,
report the information to the I.R.S. under the exchange of information provisions of the
U.K. - U.S. DTA. The draft U.K. legislation is expected in mid-December 2012 and
should be formally enacted by July 2013.
A U.K. FI is defined broadly. The U.K. IGA applies to any U.K. FI that is tax resident
in the U.K.4s As a result, U.K. branches of non-U.K. FFIs can benefit from the U.K.
IGA. The U.K. IGA sets out the information that U.K. FIs will have to report to HMRC,
and the timeline for compliance. Any U.K. FI that satisfies the reporting obligations con-
tained in the U.K. IGA will be treated as FATCA compliant and will not be subject to any
withholding on U.S. source income received.
Following the publication of the U.K. IGA, HMRC launched a consultation (which has
now closed) on the implementation of the U.K. IGA into U.K. domestic legislation.46
HMRC asked for views from those affected by FATCA. Comments have been made in
particular with regards to the definitions of "Depositary Institution," "Custodial Institu-
tion," and "Investment Entity" to ensure that these are sufficiently well defined in relation
to U.K. specific entities to provide certainty.47
Part of the consultation considered whether there should be a concept of a "nil return,"
where U.K FIs that do not have any U.S. account holders can make a one-off declaration
on a "nil return," and then agree to update HMRC if their position changes.48 This
42. U.K IGA, supra note 28, art. 7, 11 1-2.
43. Id. app. 2.
44. Id. art. 4.
45. Id. art. 1, 1 IL.
46. See generally, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, IMPLEMENTING THE UK-US FATCA AGREEMENT (Sept.
18, 2012), http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/downloadFile?contentlD=HMCEPRODI-
032308.
47. Id. at 8, 10.
48. See HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE (UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA) REGULATIONS 2013: GUIDANCE NOTEs 32 (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
drafts/uk-us-fatca-guidance-notes.pdf.
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would certainly reduce the compliance burden on such U.K. FIs, while allowing them to
be FATCA registered and compliant so that their ability to do business with other FFIs is
not affected.
One area of uncertainty of considerable concern relates to the impact of FATCA on
multi-nationals. Here, the implementation of FATCA across borders is key. Harmoniza-
tion across FATCA partner jurisdictions should be possible. Some accommodation for
inter-party communication among those jurisdictions may be needed, however, to facili-
tate disclosure of information required for full compliance. Difficulties will remain for
those FFIs with branches or subsidiaries in non-FATCA partner jurisdictions.
Additional information is expected shortly on how FATCA will be implemented in the
United Kingdom. In the meantime, all affected by FATCA implementation are awaiting
the release of the U.S. Final Regulations and the FFI Agreement by the U.S. government.
In addition, the United States has promised details to clarify the registration process.
Publication is expected in the spring of 2013, at which time the picture on FATCA com-
pliance and implementation should be much clearer.
VI. Brazilian Perspective
The U.S. government views the creation of FATCA as an important step to enhance tax
compliance and to provide the government with important information on foreign finan-
cial assets and offshore accounts of U.S. accountholders. Notably, the concept of a "U.S.
Person" for purposes of FATCA has an entirely U.S. meaning and is based on provisions
contained in the U.S. I.R.C.49 To ensure proper identification of relevant accountholders,
FFIs will be required to seek assistance from qualified U.S. tax professionals in order to set
up appropriate due diligence procedures. Common-sense assumptions of what is relevant
in this determination may be inaccurate.
The intent behind the FATCA rules is unquestionably in line with the attitudes of tax
administrations in most jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the significant resource and financial
burdens of transparency are undeniably placed unfairly and unilaterally on third party
FFIs through economic pressure. FFIs will be required to report directly to the I.R.S. and
provide information about financial accounts held by U.S. Persons or by foreign entities
in which U.S. Persons hold substantial ownership interests. Failure to do so will result in
exorbitant FATCA withholding tax costs. In some cases, the taxable amounts are other-
wise exempt from any U.S. tax under U.S. domestic law or treaty provisions.
Brazilian financial institutions (Brazilian FIs) have found themselves in a rather awk-
ward position. Brazil appears on the list of countries with whom the United States has
indicated that it is having discussions.50 The Central Bank of Brazil and the various Bra-
zilian Banking Associations are certainly aware of and considering the implications of
FATCA compliance and implementation. All that said, the Brazilian constitution and do-
mestic law present many obstacles to this process.
49. FATCA§§ 501-41, 124 Stat. at 104.
50. Neil Aragones, President's Trip to Brazil Emphasizes Need for Tax Treaty, Lexs TAx STAFF ANALYSES




First, Brazilian law, as currently in force, does not allow voluntary compliance by Bra-
zilian FIs with the FATCA rules. The Brazilian Federal Constitution limits this. It is
readily apparent that the FATCA rules are inconsistent with Brazilian constitutional prin-
ciples such as sovereignty,5 free enterprise and protection to customers,5 2 organization of
the financial system,5 3 and the essential principles of privacy and equality of rights be-
tween Brazilians and foreigners who live in Brazil.54 The main obstacle to FATCA com-
pliance that a Brazilian FI will face, nonetheless, is that it violates the principle of secrecy.
Briefly, the principle of secrecy expressly includes all mail and telegraphic communica-
tions, and data and telephonic communications in general (a few exceptions apply).55 The
principle of secrecy does not explicitly include banking information. Brazilian treatises
and doctrine, however, are solid in affirming that the secrecy principle includes bank se-
crecy. Indeed, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld bank secrecy
over the past years.
The Brazilian federal government tends not to agree with this judicial position. In
2001, it issued infra-constitutional Complementary Law (LC) 105 allowing Brazilian FIs
to provide information on clients in defined situations.5 6 An amendment to LC 105
would tend to open avenues for Brazilian FIs to provide FATCA information. The issue,
however, is that LC 105's constitutionality has been challenged, and the final response of
the Brazilian Courts is still pending.
Therefore, before the government amends the law, the Brazilian Courts still need to
answer some questions definitively. The first question is whether bank secrecy is en-
shrined as a right in the Brazilian Constitution. If it is, LC 105 is unconstitutional and
bank secrecy will be recognized as an essential right under Article 5. If this is so, Brazil
would need a new federal constitution to change this.
If the Brazilian Courts find that bank secrecy is not constitutionally guaranteed under
Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, LC 105 will be valid and could be amended to
include the possibility of exchange of information between Brazil and the United States.
Even then, an amendment to LC 105 would not be sufficient to permit a Brazilian FI to
provide information directly to a foreign tax administration such as the Internal Revenue
Service. To implement the exchange between Brazil and the United States, a TIEA or a
DTA to provide for the further exchange between the governments would be necessary. A
TIEA currently exists between Brazil and the United States, but it is not in force. The
countries signed it in 2007.s7 The House of Representatives approved it in 2010, but it is
still pending approval by the Senate. The TIEA allows the exchange of information avail-
able in the records of each Revenue Service, regardless of any judicial order.
51. Constituigio Federal [C.F.] [CONscrnrnoN] art. I (Braz.).
52. Id. art. 170.
53. Id. art. 192.
54. Id. art. 5, 11 I, X.
55. Id. art. 5, T XII.
56. Lei Complementar No. 105, de 10 de Janeiro de 2001, DuARo OnclAL DA UNIAo (D.O.U.] de
11.1.2001, available at http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Legislacao/LeisComplementares/2001/leicpl05.
htm.
57. I.R.S. Press Release HP-335 (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/hp335.aspx.
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A second issue for Brazilian FIs is the requirement, under the current FATCA regula-
tions, that they withhold on payments made from Brazil to third parties and remit the
amounts withheld to the I.R.S. The rules require a participating FFI for FATCA purposes
to withhold on any pass-through payment that is a withholdable payment made to a recal-
citrant accountholder or a non-participating FFI.
Again, this requirement raises sovereignty matters because U.S. legislation is not en-
forceable in Brazil. The withholding of U.S. tax would not be a "tax" for Brazilian pur-
poses. The United States has no nexus to Brazil for local taxation of worldwide income.
Additionally, the "tax" would not be collected on behalf of the Brazilian federal govern-
ment. This violates the Federal Constitution.
In complying with FATCA requirements, all Brazilian FIs will also likely face conflicts
under Brazilian consumer laws. These laws prohibit discrimination against customers and
unilateral changes to contracts. Brazilian FIs will face challenges arising from foreign
capital legislation that guarantees equality of treatment to Brazilian capital. Further, the
Central Bank and SEC would challenge the FIs because these entities prohibit the charg-
ing of taxes.
Brazilian FIs are at the very beginning of a long journey as they attempt to determine
whether they can comply with FATCA and thereby avoid the threat of U.S. FATCA with-
holding. Given the wide scope of legislative and regulatory constraints, a favorable resolu-
tion would require a task force comprised of the federal government and the judicial
courts to modify existing concepts and rules.
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